Regional Sex Trafficking in the Balkans

Transnational Networks in an Enlarged Europe

Nicole Lindstrom

Trafficking is an economic and human rights issue that calls for a regional solution.

TEKJIA lies on the Danube River, five minutes by boat from the Romanian border, in a remote and sparsely populated region of northwestern Serbia. The town gained notoriety in 2002 when a truck loaded with the bodies of more than 100 Kosovar-Albanians was dredged from the river. The Danube crossing at Tekija is an infamous site for illegal trafficking of goods from Romania to Serbia. The organizers of a European non-governmental organization chose Tekija as the site for a 2003 workshop designed to bring together West European and Balkan non-governmental activists to coordinate their anti-trafficking efforts. On an afternoon boat excursion down the Danube, the workshop participants came face-to-face with the trafficking trade. The Serbian boat captain told the members of a Belgrade anti-trafficking group that they were not the first women he had ferried down the river that day. Having formerly smuggled guns and cigarettes during the Milošević regime, the captain now makes his living smuggling women, which, he says, is more profitable and less risky. The captain explained how trafficking occurs mainly at night, when handlers on the Romanian side of the river turn over groups of two to six women to local boat owners who deliver them to Serbian handlers waiting on the other side.

This snapshot highlights a number of features of the expanding sex-trafficking trade in the Balkans. It illus-
trates how three interrelated social groups—traffickers, trafficked women, and opponents of trafficking—are intricately involved in the regional economy of the sex trade. Traffickers capitalize on permeable borders, political and military instability, economic dislocation, and rampant corruption to create efficient supply chains to satisfy the lucrative market for sex workers in Western Europe and the Balkans. Many of the methods and routes used to smuggle contraband and escape international sanctions during the wars of the early 1990s are now used to traffic persons. The snapshot also highlights how trafficked women are viewed as commodities. The Tekija boat captain described his cargo of humans as interchangeable with other commodities, such as arms and tobacco. Anti-trafficking forces perpetuate the commodification of trafficked women by depicting them as passive victims to be counted, assisted, and managed. The Tekija example also depicts how local, regional, and international anti-trafficking forces are coordinating their efforts to combat trafficking at a regional level. As one local organizer of the Tekija workshop remarked: “We must become as coordinated, flexible, and effective as the traffickers.” All three social forces transcend the rigid territorial boundaries of the state, operating simultaneously at sub-national, national, and supra-national levels.

Human trafficking is a phenomenon of global proportions. Two million women and children are trafficked globally each year, generating billions of dollars in profit. Trafficking in women is one manifestation of the wider structural changes brought about by globalization and regionalization. The trafficking trade is simultaneously de-territorialized and deeply territorialized, spanning the globe yet strategically concentrated in specific places. More in-depth analyses of specific locales of the trafficking trade can foster a better understanding of its unique dynamics and help generate more effective strategies to combat it. This article examines one region, the Balkans, where the global sex-trafficking trade is flourishing. Although a marginal and under-developed region in the formal global and European political economy, the Balkans are an important hub in illegal trading networks.

The Regional Context

Measuring the volume, scope, and patterns of sex trafficking is an extremely difficult process. The traffickers are very flexible, quickly changing routes to accommodate fluctuating supply and demand or to evade increased law enforcement measures. The two most common trafficking routes begin in Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania and move through Serbia, and on to West European markets, primarily through Hungary and Slovenia, or to destination points in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Macedonia. Trade routes in the southwestern Balkans change frequently. For instance, since police have disrupted the trafficking of women by speedboats from the Albanian port of Vlora to Italy, traffickers have moved their operations to the Albanian port of Dürres, Adriatic port towns in Montenegro, or overland through Greece and Macedonia. Assessing the number of trafficked women is also difficult. The criminalizing of prostitution and migration moves the trade increasingly underground, where women are shielded both from law enforcement and assistance providers.

The most widely used sources of data on the trafficking trade are provided by international and local non-governmental organizations involved in assisting, and often repatriating, trafficked women and by national and international law-enforcement agencies. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), each year more than 400,000 women are trafficked through the Balkans to the states of the European Union. Another 170,000 women are trafficked annually into the Balkan region. The IOM differentiates countries of “origin,” “transit,” and “destination.” Moldova and Romania are typically characterized as states of origin, Serbia and Albania as transit states, and Bosnia and Kosovo as destination states, due to the large presence of international military and international personnel stationed there. A recently established Regional Clearing Point measures the scope of the trafficking trade by counting the number of trafficked women assisted by local or international NGOs. Table 1 gives the results from 2000 to June 2003 by country of origin.

The IOM report concludes that the largest percentage of women included in the data were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. Most of the women were identified and assisted within the first month of being trafficked, and they reported having accepted a false offer of employment abroad or being recruited by an acquaintance. The authors of the report concede that relying on figures based on assisted victims dramatically underestimates the scope of the trade. The figures do not account for the large number of women successfully trafficked through the Balkans to the EU and other markets. Helga Konrad, chair of the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, suggests in the report’s preface that the declining number of assisted women is not a promising sign. According to Konrad:
The figures show that the trafficking in human beings is going underground. It shows that the traffickers rapidly react to our responses in the fight against human trafficking. And it shows that the victims are no longer found in bars and brothels. Brothel raids caused traffickers to shift the victims to private locations where, of course, access is more difficult and where it becomes more difficult to provide assistance.\(^7\)

She concludes that trafficking opponents might need to rethink whether enhanced policing in the form of brothel raids is the right approach to assisting victims. The classification of states by origin, transit, and destination also obscures the realities of Balkan trafficking, because most states now exhibit characteristics of all three categories. With the continuing decline in living standards and rising rates of unemployment across the region, states such as Serbia and Bosnia, traditionally classified as transit and destination states, are also becoming states of origin as more women are forced to seek illegal employment in the sex trade. The reported increase in trafficking within countries further blurs these distinctions.

National, regional, and international law enforcement agencies operating in the Balkans provide another major source of data on sex trafficking. In September 2002, the Southeastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) organized a regional anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling taskforce dubbed Operation Mirage. With the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies, national IOM missions, the United Nations mission in Kosovo, and local NGOs raided more than 20,000 bars, hotels, nightclubs, and border crossings. Based on 13,000 interviews with women and children discovered in the sweeps, 237 were identified as victims of trafficking, only 4 percent of whom were given assistance in shelters. Another 2,700 women and children were classified as voluntary migrants and arrested, deported, or prosecuted. The operation identified 293 traffickers, several of whom will be tried in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia and Montenegro.\(^8\)

Operation Mirage relied on the international legal definition of trafficking, which requires entrapment or coercion. In some cases this distinction is easy to make. In one testimony, a woman reported that in the “Arizona” marketplace outside the Bosnian Stabilization Force (SFOR) base in Bihac: “When buyers come, girls are ordered to take off their clothes and stand naked in the road. They are exhibited like cattle for selection.”\(^9\)

In another brothel raid in Podgorica, police found ten girls between the ages of thirteen and sixteen locked inside. In most cases, however, it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether someone has

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,203</td>
</tr>
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</table>


**Note:** Total does not include two persons identified from Czech Republic, and one each from Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Albania figure does not include 1,200 persons assisted by Together Against Child Trafficking, which does not break down figures annually.
been “voluntarily smuggled” or “involuntarily trafficked.” According to strict legal criteria, a Moldovan woman working without proper documentation in a Bosnian brothel would probably be counted as “trafficked,” while a Bosnian woman working in the same brothel might be subject to arrest and prosecution. Depending on the rigid dualities of trafficking versus smuggling, and voluntary versus involuntary prostitution, does not simply have serious legal and political repercussions. These rigid categories obscure the more complex and systemic structural dynamics in which the trafficking trade flourishes. Women are trafficked for work in the sex industry for a variety of reasons. Many women are kidnapped or coerced to leave their homes under false promises of legal work in the West, and forced into prostitution through threats, bondage, and even torture. While such egregious violations of human rights attract the most headlines and rightfully place anti-trafficking efforts high on the policy agenda, in reality most women migrate more or less voluntarily. Few of them would opt for prostitution if not for economic hardship or lack of access to legal labor markets. For many women sex work abroad is viewed as a way to escape poverty in their home countries and a temporary measure until they can obtain legal employment in the West.

Diverging Definitions and Approaches

All the institutions involved in combating human trafficking in the Balkans operate under the same body of international law. In theory anti-trafficking forces should abide by the definition of trafficking outlined in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

The protocol goes on to define “exploitation” as including, at a minimum, “the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs.”

In practice, anti-trafficking actors in the Balkans approach the issue of trafficking in different ways. These can be categorized into four distinct, but interrelated, approaches: migration, criminalization, human rights, and structural. How anti-trafficking actors frame the issue of human trafficking conditions the strategies they pursue in combating the trade.

Migration

The migration approach conceptualizes the trafficking problem as one of unregulated, or “irregular,” economic migration. IOM exemplifies the migration approach to trafficking. The International Organization for Migration is a complex trans-national agency, dealing with migration policy design and implementation. It prides itself on having moved 11 million people since its inception, 450,000 people worldwide in 2000 alone. In the Balkans IOM operates or funds twenty-six temporary shelters specifically established to repatriate women back to their countries of origin through “voluntary assistance programs.” Since 2000, it has repatriated more than 2,000 trafficked women. The high rates of re-trafficking—almost half of the women repatriated are re-trafficked within a year—has called into question the long-term effectiveness of IOM’s migration approach to anti-trafficking.

Law Enforcement

The law enforcement approach views trafficking in human beings as a crime equivalent to trafficking in drugs and arms. Many of the same regional organized-crime groups are targeted for their role in trafficking women, and similar tactics are used to find and prosecute the perpetrators. National governments, particularly ministries of the interior and domestic and border police, operate according to this approach, as do regional initiatives such as SECI or regional law enforcement organizations such as Interpol and Europol. While high-profile operations such as Mirage and heightened levels of policing have resulted in some traffickers being arrested and eventually prosecuted, the law enforcement approach has not significantly reduced the trade. Traffickers have shown great flexibility and ingenuity in eluding police, quickly changing transportation and distribution routes, or moving operations further underground. The law enforcement approach has also had some negative consequences both for trafficked women and for the anti-trafficking groups providing assistance. Police raids on brothels, nightclubs, and other public establishments have moved much of the prostitution trade to private apartments, often on the outskirts of cities and towns, where the women are further isolated and vulnerable to violent abuse.

Human Rights

The human rights approach frames trafficking in women as a violation of individual human
rights, and emphasizes the violent and coercive nature of the human-trafficking trade. This understanding of trafficking underlies the approach of international organizations like the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings for Southeastern Europe explicitly states that trafficking is “first and foremost a violation of human rights,” but advocates that this approach works best in tandem with the law enforcement approach.  

Most international and local human rights groups approach and organize their efforts around such a definition, although with notable differences. The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) places trafficking in the context of sexual exploitation, resists attempts to separate trafficking from prostitution, and often describes trafficking in women as “slavery” or a “slave trade” in its awareness campaigns. The Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW) adopted wider definitions, framing trafficking in women as primarily an economic issue. By defining prostitution as “sex work” or an income-generating form of labor, GAATW seeks to counter the efforts of organizations like CATW to portray trafficking solely as sexual exploitation or slavery. Such differences in definitions and approaches are visible among local human rights groups. Some local NGOs, such as the network of La Strada chapters, work more closely with IOM to assist and repatriate victims of trafficking to their countries of origin. Other local NGOs, such as the Belgrade-based ASTRA, fall closer to GAATW’s approach to trafficking. These NGOs lobby governments to decriminalize prostitution. They also advocate the creation of re-integration centers that offer educational and vocational services to assimilate women into the legitimate local economy as an alternative to IOM’s repatriation-oriented assistance model.

**Structural.** The structural approach shifts the emphasis from intention-based understandings of trafficking in women to a focus on its structural roots: global and regional inequities in the distribution of jobs, resources, and wealth. Trans-national and local groups adopting this approach, including GAATW, promote the simultaneous aims of easing the EU’s restrictive migration policies and shifting funding priorities away from law enforcement and border control to economic and political development.

The multiple approaches to trafficking highlight the complex and politically contested nature of the issue. Different understandings of trafficking can be used instrumentally to legitimize certain policies. They also condition and engender different responses to the problem. The various interpretations and policy responses to trafficking are debated within and between the multiple sub-state, state, and supra-national anti-trafficking actors operating in the Balkans. Since the EU has become one of the most influential political and economic actors in the Balkans, it is worthwhile to consider how the dynamics of trafficking and anti-trafficking can be understood and addressed within the context of an enlarged Europe.

**The EU and Balkan Sex Trafficking Networks**

The European Union is not the sole destination of the Balkan trafficking trade. Yet the push factors of social distintegration and poverty in the Balkans, combined with the pull factors of high wages and social benefits in the nearby EU, makes the EU member states important destinations in the trafficking trade. EU institutions and agencies are not the only trans-national actors involved in anti-trafficking efforts, but they are increasingly becoming the central ones. By far the largest assistance donor to the Balkans as a whole, the EU has adopted an aggressive approach to combating human trafficking and other illegal trade in the Balkans. By combining political conditionality (sticks) with development aid (carrots), the EU effectively forces states to comply with its approach. The EU’s attitude toward anti-trafficking highlights a fundamental dilemma facing the enlarging and deepening union: how to ensure the free and legal flow of capital, goods, services, and labor within the EU while simultaneously containing the illegal flow of capital, goods, services, and labor in an increasingly deregulated and enlarging EU. The Europe-wide “Strategy on Trafficking” proposes two interrelated solutions: strengthening law enforcement capabilities, including tightening external borders, and improving the social and economic conditions of women within and beyond the EU. The broader European anti-trafficking agenda combines elements of the migration, law enforcement, human rights, and structural approaches outlined above. Which of these approaches is emphasized in practice, however, varies over time, depending on the vagaries of the political climate and the place. In combating sex trafficking and other crime in the Balkans, the EU emphasizes the law enforcement or migration approach, often at the expense of human rights or structural concerns.
In terms of symbolic geography, the Balkans have always been a part of Europe, albeit an economically marginal and culturally stigmatized part. The region often evokes images of a bridge or crossroads between Occident and Orient, developed and under-developed, civilized and uncivilized.22 The regime changes of 1989 and after fueled hopes that all the states in the Balkans would quickly “return to Europe,” assume their rightful place in European civilization, and gain full membership in European institutions. A decade later, the region remains at a crossroads. Mungiu-Pippidi describes the Balkan states as now comprising a “unique class of laggards” in the EU enlargement process, distributed into “three poorly separated waiting rooms.”23 The first comprises Bulgaria and Romania, the states furthest advanced in accession negotiations and poised to join the EU in 2007. The second group contains the signatories of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), like Croatia, which are relatively economically advanced and politically stable and thus might, viewing the matter optimistically, enter the EU with Bulgaria and Romania. The third holds a mixture of international protectorates (Bosnia), secessionist regions (Kosovo), and semi-sovereign states such as Montenegro and Macedonia. Serbia and Albania are caught in a “twilight zone,” for the time being belonging neither to the second nor the third waiting room.24 This mixture of states with varying relations to the EU fosters a general aura of unpredictability in the region, as well as competition as governments scramble to improve their standing in the accession queue.25

There are significant differences in economic terms as well, both between the Balkans and the EU, and within the region. Gaps in average per capita GDP in purchasing power standards between Balkan states and the current EU average range from 25 percent in Bulgaria and Romania to less than 10 percent in Albania.26 The gap is also widening between the Balkan states and the bordering states of Central and Eastern Europe positioned to enter the EU in June 2004. The GDP of Slovenia now stands at 74 percent of the EU average, on par with member states like Greece, while Hungary’s GDP is nearly 60 percent of the EU average. The new border of the enlarged EU now separates countries of origin of trafficked women, such as Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, from the more economically developed EU current and new member states.

In March 2001, the EU issued a “Comprehensive European Strategy on Trafficking in Women.” Subtitled “The Misery Behind the Fantasy: From Poverty to Sex Slavery,” the strategy paper frames trafficking as encompassing a range of issues: crime, prostitution, migration, human rights, and EU enlargement. These multiple understandings of the problem are reflected in the multiple strategies proposed by the EU: strengthening and coordinating law enforcement capabilities on a region-wide level, tightening external borders and visa controls, supporting human rights groups in publicizing the issue, providing humanitarian, legal and social assistance to victims of trafficking, and, finally, improving the social and economic conditions of women within and beyond the EU.27 All of these strategies can be seen to some degree in the multiple anti-trafficking programs the EU funds or manages in the Balkans today. Taken together, the EU’s anti-sex-trafficking efforts in the Balkans reflect two interrelated features of its external policy toward the Balkans: furthering regional cooperation and enhancing the ability of law enforcement to control borders and fight organized crime.

**Regional Cooperation.** Developing and promoting enhanced cooperation is a central feature of the EU’s policy toward the western Balkans, which includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. The EU views regional cooperation as an essential means to guarantee Balkan stability. Regional cooperation can assist in normalizing diplomatic relations and furthering economic reconciliation. It promises to foster economic growth by improving opportunities for trade and investment and solving infrastructure bottlenecks. Regional cooperation can also lead to better-coordinated efforts to combat organized crime, illegal migration, and human trafficking.28 The EU’s promotion of regional cooperation is not just cheap talk. To enter formal EU membership negotiations, states first must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for democratic governance. In addition, the EU has made regional cooperation a condition of membership through its SAA process. The EU has also earmarked 10 percent of all funding to the region, through Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization (CARDS) funds, to promote regional cooperation.

The EU’s Balkan strategy seeks to build on a number of existing regional initiatives. SECI, launched by the United States in 1997, has now been reorganized as a regional law enforcement body. The EU has also actively supported bottom-up initiatives, such as the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The July 2000 launch of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe in Sarajevo raised expectations of substantive regional cooperation. When hopes that the Stability Pact would bring a massive influx of aid on
the scale of the Marshall Plan failed to materialize, critics began to dismiss the pact as little more than a public relations scheme on the part of its co-sponsors, the EU and the United States. The Stability Pact indeed suffers from fuzzy goals, indeterminate timelines, and a paucity of funding. However, the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings has played a key role in coordinating anti-trafficking efforts in the region and cooperates closely with regional law enforcement initiatives.

**Law Enforcement.** The EU has made controlling borders and combating crime and illegal migration a main objective of its Balkan strategy. The CARDS program, adopted in late 2000, committed more than 4.6 billion euros in aid to the Western Balkans through the end of 2006. The overarching aim of CARDS is to prepare Balkan countries for EU membership. CARDS allocations fund post-war reconstruction and institutional and legislative reform, and help states improve economic conditions to the point where they can be competitive within the EU. In order to be accepted for membership, applicant states must harmonize their legislation with the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Constituting the third pillar of the European Community, JHA has as one of its main objectives the tightening of the common external border of the EU and combating illegal immigration and international crime. Meeting JHA criteria has been a central feature of the first rounds of enlargement negotiations. As a result, acceding countries like Slovenia and Hungary now act as “gatekeepers” or “buffer zones” vis-à-vis the non-EU members to their south and east.29

The priority the EU has placed on combating illegal trade and migration in the Balkans is reflected in the high allocation of CARDS funding commitments toward JHA. Between 2001 and 2003 every fifth euro spent was spent on JHA (see Table 2). More than 50 percent of Albania’s total CARDS allocation of 128.9 million euros annually over the past three years has gone to JHA funding areas. While the legitimacy of these funding priorities may be debatable, every euro allocated for increased law enforcement and border control is a euro taken away from economic development and poverty reduction. Increased allocations for law enforcement have no effect on the push factors of social disintegration and poverty that lead to a steady supply of women willingly or unwillingly being trafficked through the Balkans. Trans-national organized trafficking groups continue to thrive.

### Rethinking Strategy

New patterns of exclusion and inclusion are emerging in the enlarged Europe. The new boundaries of Europe divide the prosperous zones of peace from the impoverished zones of instability. Linking anti-trafficking efforts to the security interests of EU member states facilitates a political dynamic by which the border between the law-enforcement-exporting states of the EU is increasingly fortified against the crime-exporting states of the Balkans. Tightened borders and stricter migration policies do little to diminish the trafficking trade and could, in fact, increase trafficking profits as migration becomes more expensive.30 Traffickers will continue to reach down to the lower rungs of society, an

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**Table 2**

**Percentage of Total CARDS Commitments Allocated for Justice and Home Affairs, 2001–2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JHA as percentage of total CARDS national allocation</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: European Commission, “Fighting Organized Crime in the Balkans” (Brussels, Report No. IP/03/1608, November 26, 2003).*

*Note: JHA allocations divided into categories: police, public order, and organized crime; customs and taxation; integrated border management; judiciary reform; asylum and migration.*
impoveryed sub-stratum that does not lend itself to the easy strategies prescribed by state and inter-state institutions.\textsuperscript{31} Traffickers and trafficked women can be viewed as two complementary social forces participating in the trafficking economy. Both forces impair the licit channels of neo-liberal restructuring, democratization, and—the ultimate aim—European Union accession.

Combating trafficking requires a step-by-step process of creating an extended zone of positive interdependence and mutual understanding between the EU and the Balkans. If the EU expects the Balkan states to meet costly conditions, it should offer conditional opportunities for liberalizing trade, especially in highly protected sectors such as agriculture and textiles, more substantial physical and social infrastructure assistance, and relaxed visa restrictions.\textsuperscript{32} Expanding such benefits will have some short-term consequences, including possible threats to the well-being of certain constituents of the EU and backlash from those advocating stricter border and immigration controls. Understanding trafficking as a function of economic dependency and human rights, rather than strictly as an illegal migration or law enforcement issue, will foster longer-term solutions to the issue.

Notes


5. According to Regional Clearing Point, more than half of the women assisted reported that they had transited Serbia at some point in their trafficking experience. See Regional Clearing Point’s \textit{First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Eastern Europe} (Vienna: International Organization for Migration, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings, and International Catholic Migration Commission, September 2003), available at www.icmc.net/files/rcp2003full.en.pdf.


11. For a summary of the feminization of poverty in Central and Eastern Europe, see Rebecca Jean Emigh and Iván Szelenyi, eds., \textit{Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern Europe During the Market Transition} (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

12. This supplements the UN Convention on Trans-national Organized Crime adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 2000.


14. The first three categories are used in \textit{Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe}.


17. Ibid., p. 23.

18. The underground nature of trafficking is portrayed in Lukas Moodysson’s 2002 film, \textit{Lilja 4-Ever}. In this fictional account, a young Russian woman, unemployed and living in poverty in a Russian province, is recruited by an acquaintance with the promise of legal employment in Sweden. She arrives by plane in Stockholm, then is driven to a provincial industrial city, raped by her handler, and held captive in an apartment building by her pimp.


20. For an academic example of this kind of analysis, see Donna Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women” \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 53, no. 2 (spring 2000): 625–51.


22. See Maria Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Samuel Huntington has perpetuated this view by arguing that the Balkans are a central “fault line” separating Western, Orthodox, and Muslim civilizations; see \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).


24. Ibid.

25. The EU accession process has spurred a kind of regional horse race, whereby states compete to close more chapters of the \textit{acquis} vis-à-vis their neighbors.


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